At a pragmatic level, we all know what universities are: institutions of various sizes that deliver tertiary level education. In the same way that we have Christian primary schools and Christian secondary schools, so also we have a few Christian tertiary schools, i.e. Christian universities. Why ask if there “can be” something that we already have?

Yet there has long been a complex literature on what a university is. Any serious answer to the question posed in the title of this essay will not be merely pragmatic; it will take on something of the definitional, even of the prescriptive.

History and Definition

At the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries, Western universities were born. They began either as Cathedral Schools (e.g. the University of Paris, which grew out of the Cathedral of Notre Dame; Oxford University) or at least as small colleges where all the teaching was undertaken by one religious order or another (e.g. Cambridge University). Theology was the queen of the sciences. The curriculum was essentially twofold: Scripture (and its interpretation) and nature. The theocentric assumptions held the educational vision together: this was the beginning of the university. Indeed, throughout the Middle Ages and well into the Enlightenment period, the centrality of the Bible and of theology as that which held together the vision of intellectual endeavor was amply attested by two things: the ordering principles of the libraries and the shape of the curriculum. The libraries were ordered to give Scripture and theology the central place. As for the curriculum, the study of the Bible was early augmented by the study of profane texts, but still within a theological faculty. The theological faculty was soon augmented by faculties of law and of medicine. To this was added philosophy, as the handmaiden of theology. Philosophy soon expanded from the lower trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and logic) and the higher quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music) to include virtually whatever knowledge people wanted to subsume under its aegis. At least the lower trivium had to be mastered before one was thought ready for detailed study of theology; ideally, both the trivium and the quadrivium were studied before theology. Thus theology was the queen, the apex of study, the culminating unifier. Over the centuries, philosophy subdivided into the humanities (= liberal arts) and science (= natural philosophy), and, more recently, social sciences. All this shows, of course, that Western universities began with a strong emphasis on the unity of knowledge, on the university. What held it together was the notion of revelation, and broad consensus that there is one Mind, the mind of the personal-transcendent God, that unites all knowledge and truth in himself.

The dawning of the Enlightenment did not change all of this overnight. Certainly
reason was increasingly elevated over revelation and faith, but this took time. Many who saw themselves as the children of the Enlightenment were Christians, or at least theists, or at least deists. If in Britain the eighteenth century was the century of David Hume, it was also the century of Thomas Reid—not to mention preachers such as Howell Harris, George Whitefield, and the Wesleys. Under God, these preachers changed the face of the nation; Whitefield, in conjunction with others such as Jonathan Edwards, transformed the face of America. On the other hand, one must not forget that at this point the universities and fledgling colleges were, by and large, the preserve of an elite. Increasingly, the intellectual elite forged a way toward philosophical naturalism. Under its aegis, science itself, by the twentieth century, was increasingly redefined. Instead of being above all an empirical discipline, it became an empirical and theoretical discipline nurtured by the "axiom" of materialist philosophy.

What preserves the university as a university during the later stages of this so-called "modern" period is a nexus of presuppositions and commitments: strong belief in the autonomy and power of reason, massive assumptions about progress, widespread conviction that truth is objective and attainable, and, as I have already indicated, rising philosophical naturalism. In other words, what kept the university together was not the Christian worldview that prevailed several centuries earlier, but the common commitment to a common process. If in addition some university teachers were Christians or Buddhists or whatever, there was little objection, provided their religious commitments did not too greatly impinge on how they played the university game. Religious convictions were largely judged to belong to the realm of faith as opposed to fact, to personal preference as opposed to public truth. Some universities (especially in Europe, but a few here, as well) continued to have faculties of divinity, but increasingly (with some wonderful exceptions) the rules of the game in the faculties of divinity were played under the same naturalistic assumptions deployed throughout the rest of the university. Thus there were many theists in such departments, but the form of their argumentation, as they taught their texts and debated their theories and published their theses, was, with only the rarest exceptions, distanced from faith commitment. It was so much more acceptable to talk about the beliefs of the early Christians regarding the resurrection of Jesus than about the resurrection itself. It was acceptable to be religious, then, and one might even be lauded for it if such religious convictions issued in observable "humanitarian" philanthropic endeavor. But what was commended was the philanthropy, not the Christian convictions or the religious worldview, which was judged to be incidental to the university mission, and at least potentially damaging to it if it began to impinge on the ostensibly neutrality of naturalism’s reason and methods. Perhaps these developments are best caught in the vignette of Mother Teresa giving a lecture at Harvard in 1982. She spent most of her time exhorting her hearers to follow Jesus. When the student newspaper ran a story on the event, she was praised for her philanthropy while her address was reported without a single mention of the J-word.

Before pressing forward with this potted history, we shall do well to pause and reflect on two authors whose work until
recent times defined discussion as to what a university should be. The first is the seminal book by John Henry Newman (1801-1890). His *The Idea of a University* is universally recognized to be the foundational discussion in modern times. Much of Newman’s writing on the subject was precipitated by the 1851 invitation from Archbishop Cullen to preside over the establishment of a Catholic University in Dublin. This Newman did, though his record as an administrator was mixed, and he returned to Birmingham in 1858. Nevertheless the challenge provided him with the opportunity to think through what a university should be. His accumulated writings on the subject (which writings constitute *The Idea of a University*, first published under that title in 1873, though the constituent parts first began to appear in print in 1852) reflect his profound commitment to Roman Catholicism (he became a Catholic in 1845). They are subtle, intelligent, occasionally over-wrought, and sometimes profound.

For our purposes, we may reflect on three of his principal ideas. (1) Newman argues that there is a need for a distinctively Catholic university. Unlike other universities of the time, whether they be Protestant, religiously mixed, or entirely secular, a Catholic university will unashamedly teach Roman Catholic doctrine, not least the doctrine of God. Such doctrine, i.e. such knowledge, is by definition universal. Therefore universities that fail to teach such subject matter as a science, i.e. as a body of true knowledge, do not teach universal knowledge, and are by this definition fatally flawed. Other universities may be excellent models of some other elements of education, but in this respect they are not universities at all. (2) Nevertheless, Newman argues that a Catholic University should provide what today we would call a liberal arts education. In other words, Catholic universities should not simply be professional schools training Catholic clergy. Newman does not think that a university education should primarily be a means of gaining a profession, of finding a vocation, or learning a trade. Rather, the purpose of a university education is to expand the horizon, to enlarge the student’s outlook, train his or her mind, and develop civic and social skills in interaction. (3) Newman then distinguishes what a university does and what the (Roman Catholic) faith does. The former helps human beings acquire broad knowledge, moral resolve, growing intelligence, and social sensitivity. It does this, however, by means of education; it prepares a man to become a Gentleman (Newman’s category). It does not, however, make a Christian. Earthly virtues are good in themselves and are worth pursuing. But only the teaching and practice of the Roman Catholic church can fundamentally transform fallen, sinful human beings.

It is the second point that grabs attention in much contemporary discussion. That point was forged at a time when strong voices were arguing that a university ought to prepare a student for a vocation, for a job. The substance of Newman’s appeal has been repeated many times to justify the value of a liberal arts education even when no job is immediately in view. Newman argues that a liberal arts education makes a human being a better person, a better thinker, a better evaluator, and therefore when such a person becomes a lawyer or an engineer, he or she will become a better lawyer or engineer. In that indirect sense, a liberal arts education turns out to be eminently useful, even when it does not directly aim to be useful. Newman has no
hesitation about including law, science, and the like within a university’s curricu-

lum. But the primary purpose of a uni-

versity education is corrupted if it aims at nothing higher than securing a job.

For our purposes, however, the second and third points, slightly modified to con-

form to confessional evangelicalism, are of no less interest. In line with the assump-

tions of the universities that developed in the Middle Ages, Newman understands that what holds the university together is a shared worldview. For him, that is Ca-

tholism. In these papers he does not ar-

gue for the truth of Catholicism: such defenses are put forth in some of his other writings. But granted the assumption, one understands how, for him, his insistence that the Catholic doctrine of God be taught as universal truth is a definitional matter: he believes in the Roman Catholic (i.e. uni-

versal) Church. From an evangelical perspective, his religious allegiance might better be thought of as the Roman Church, which is not as catholic as it claims. But it is not for nothing that thoughtful Chris-
tians, in the words of the creed, testify that they believe in “the holy, catholic Church.” Newman’s fundamental insight, stripped of its Roman Catholicism, is surely right: if this is God’s world, if this God has disclosed himself in the world and the Word, then no knowledge can properly be thought well-organized and properly in-
tegrated if it is detached from knowledge of this God and his words and his ways.

Probably not even Newman would ar-
gue that the liberal arts curriculum in many contemporary universities is calcu-
lated to turn many a student into a “Gentleman.” Yet his attempt to preserve the primary place for revelation, while still insisting on the training of reason and the value of what would today be called the “great books” tradition, recognizing all the while that such education does nothing more than train the natural man (Newman’s choice of expression; many Protestants would not demur, but would also speak of how “common grace” operates), continues to resonate with many contemporary Christians who are trying to think through what a Christian university should be.

Consider, in partial contrast, a second seminal thinker on this subject. Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) published three separate monographs with the title Die Idee der Universitat (“The Idea of the University”). The first appeared in 1923, after World War I; the second in 1946, right after World War II and the Holocaust; the third in 1961.6 In addition, he wrote a series of “Theses,” in reality a fourth essay, on the theme of university renewal,7 sparked in part by Martin Heidegger’s 1933 “Rectorial Address,” and in part as a re-
sponse to the developing Nazi university constitution in Baden. For this Jaspers was banned from university administration (1933 on), then forbidden to teach at the University of Heidelberg (1937), and then forbidden to publish (1938).

It would be tedious to expound his thought at length,8 but the following few points have a bearing on our discussion. (1) Jaspers is indebted to the Platonic notion of Ideas as an encompassing unity of the perceivable. For Plato, there is, finally, the Idea of Platonic Ideas—what Jaspers calls “the Encompassing (das Umgreifende) of all Encompassings.” He is no less in-
debted to Kant: the Idea is a regulative prin-
ciple that both embodies and controls action. The “idea” of the university is thus for Jaspers a totally encompassing notion that embraces the ultimate horizon of all thinking and being. Clearly there is also
indebtedness here to the German Idealism of Wilhelm von Humboldt, the brilliant founder of the University of Berlin. (2) Within this framework, then, Jaspers understands the university to be “a community of scholars and students engaged in the task of seeking truth,” “an institution uniting people professionally dedicated to the quest and transmission of truth in scientific terms.” The university is the place where “the original will to know” (das ursprüngliche Wissenwollen) is realized. (3) It follows that there are four concrete objectives of the university: research inseparable from teaching, educational training, the formation of culture, and communication through scholarly debate and cooperative research both within and across various disciplines. (4) Jaspers argues that academic freedom is a privilege and an ongoing responsibility for both professors and students alike. This demands both toleration and protection by a democratic society. The university is thus indebted to society for both its protection and its finances, but the power and tasks of truth are so important that the concordat must be worked out and nurtured.

I have gone into as much detail as I have in order to make clear that a comparison of Newman’s idea of the university and Jaspers’s idea of the university belong to different centuries, different religions, different languages, and different cultures. What constitutes the unifying connection of the university for each of the two thinkers? For Newman, as we have seen, it is the truth of Christianity expressed in Roman Catholicism. For Jaspers, it is a fairly sophisticated neo-Platonic, neo-Kantian epistemology, and an unshakable confidence in the objectivity, value, and discoverability of truth. Many who have read Jaspers, however, and have not bought into his neo-Platonism nevertheless embrace his commitment to reason and the recoverability of truth. But certainly “the university idea in Newman and Jaspers is unintelligible apart from their respective faith encomapssings, differing historicities, and tradition-constituted convictions that inform their respective quests for knowledge and truth.”

What marks the move from modernity to postmodernity, so far as the idea of the university is concerned, is the loss of confidence that objective truth exists, or, that if it exists, it is discoverable. The forces that have brought about this widespread shift in perspective are many and complicated, too many to grasp comprehensively. Immigration patterns and the media of the global village have exposed us to broader and broader cultural patterns, and have (rightly) called the biases of mere traditionalism into question. The loss of biblical and theological knowledge does not mean that people have no worldviews, but that the dominant worldview of the Western Judeo-Christian culture has gone into eclipse, especially for educated people under the age of thirty-five, and has been replaced by a potpourri of perspectives unimaginable to our grandparents. The modernist epistemology, filtered through materialist philosophy, while still very strong, is burning itself out, and has sired an illegitimate heir: postmodern epistemology, in which all “knowledge” is nothing more than the peculiar mental construction of an individual or group, a societally-grounded construct with no possible way of discovering whether the construct corresponds with reality. The more cynical analyses therefore insist that all human claims of truth do not in fact depend on faith or reason, but on will to power. There is a plurality of truths, none of which
is impartial. Various literary and sociological analyses have given these perspectives a show of respectable erudition.

In this sort of environment, there is little unity left in the university. At the risk of cheap paradox, one might say that the only unity that is left is the shared view that there cannot be a university, but only a multiversity. From this perspective, a more penetrating question than the one that heads this article might be, “Can There Be a Postmodern University?”

Many things change under these developments. One of the most important is the view of tolerance. Under the best impulses of late modernism, a tolerant person was one who might think someone else was dead wrong, and who might try to persuade him or her to a better view, but who would nevertheless defend the other’s right to be heard. Under postmodernism, a tolerant person is one who holds no strong views, except the strong view that one must not hold strong (and especially exclusivistic) views. Thus a Christian who is trying to convince someone else of the truth of Christianity, no matter how courteous or evenhanded, is by definition an intolerant bigot. Departments of Divinity give way to Religious Studies Departments, where the one underlying subtext is the new definition of tolerance.¹⁵

None of these dominant views ever works out exhaustively. Universities are too large, too complex; they are made up of too many divergent individuals. Nevertheless one may usefully speak of dominant trends.

Universities are complex in other ways as well. Here I mention two. (1) There are, after all, universities that have grown up in other cultures: Chinese, Indian, Islamic, and so forth. What does university mean in such contexts, and what may we learn from them? The second of the “Regulations Concerning Academic Degrees” published by the State Education Commission of the People’s Republic of China (4 June 1989) specifies, as one of the aims of and qualifications for entrance into Chinese universities: “All citizens who support the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system and who attain a certain academic level may apply for appropriate academic degrees in accordance with the requirements stipulated by the Regulations.”¹⁶ Not dissimilar regulations are found in other regimes in which tertiary education is a state-controlled instrument for social coercion. Here there is little problem with the uni- in university. There may be more problem in terms of self-correction and competition—but I shall return to that question in a moment. (2) The idea of the Western university has become complex for several purely pragmatic reasons. Some thinkers and administrators hold that the university is primarily a training center for professionals, and do not worry at all about the metaphysical unity of the enterprise. Others—not least those who work in them—often focus on their own careers and research projects, and give very little thought to the big picture. They work in tertiary education; they give little or no thought to what a university is. This stance is now so endemic that it is “by no means a safe assumption” that we shall be able to continue to “speak of a university at all.”¹⁷ From a Christian perspective, of course, unqualified pursuit of careers is nothing other than idolatry. A few still see the university as a place where education of another generation takes place, with little emphasis on research, and with little reflection devoted to the warrants by which curricular content are chosen. Worse yet, many universities have devel-
oped a sorry record of uncontrolled social experimentation, soaring costs (way beyond inflation), unwise planning (not even watching the demographics of the nation to uncover what the student “pool” will be), and spiralling bureaucracy within and endless government controls from without.\footnote{18}

So what is a university? What is a Christian university?

**Vision**

I shall proceed by articulating a number of theses.

1. A university is a tertiary-level institution devoted to study and education in a plurality of fields at both undergraduate and graduate levels, controlled by some unifying vision. Thus I have eliminated from the discussion the specialized college, or the exclusively undergraduate institution. This is merely a pragmatic decision to conform to common usage. More importantly, a university must be “controlled by some unifying vision.” The pursuit of truth served reasonably well under the conditions of early and middle modernism. Contemporary Western universities, increasingly postmodern in their epistemology, are held together by very little common vision, and might more accurately be called multiversities.

2. A Christian university is God-centered in the structure of its thinking and in the establishment of its priorities, cheerfully pledging allegiance to the Christian revelation, and in particular the focal point of that revelation, the Lord Jesus Christ, and the gospel he has proclaimed.

If in the preceding paragraph the third word, “university,” had been replaced by “church,” the sentence would still have made excellent sense. But by “university,” with the meaning already defined, I mean to insist that the Christian university is “a tertiary-level institution devoted to study and education, etc.” (the first point); what makes it Christian is its God-centeredness—not, indeed, centering on any god, but on the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and on the revelation he has given. For us, that means embracing the Bible as God’s revealed Word, and a focus on him who is the Word incarnate.

There are numerous implications to this stance. Among other things, it means that knowledge is never an end in itself: that would be idolatry. Pelikan draws attention to the opening discussion of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which treats means and ends: “If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else…clearly this [end] must be the good and the chief good.” Pelikan points out that if knowledge becomes this “chief good” and therefore the end in itself, “the moral consequences can be frightening.”\footnote{19} Scholars who pursue knowledge in a single-minded pursuit undertaken at any price, or almost any price, not only become cut-throat with others, but may descend into the abyss of torture in order to gain better and more accurate medical “knowledge.” Thus Newman’s famous chapter, “Knowledge Its Own End,” needs some limits drawn around it. Knowledge may be a legitimate lesser end, a limited objective, a conditional goal; it cannot be the final goal without succumbing to idolatry.

3. A Christian university is passionately committed to the formation and maintenance of a Christian worldview.

It has been the failure to observe this point, more than any other, that has led to the secularization of more than a few universities begun as Christian foundations. If university professors and scholars be-
come experts in their own disciplines, while remaining intellectual pygmies with respect to the Bible and theology, the disciplines will reshape the Bible improperly; the Bible will do little to reform the disciplines. Such scholars will adopt the worldviews and priorities of others in their guild, and then gloss their convictions with biblical proof texts. That is an easy game to play, and great fun. But it does nothing for understanding or passing on the fundamentals of the faith or the structure of a Christian worldview.

There are few disciplines unaffected by such considerations—possibly pure math, but that’s about it. It is not enough to develop, say, Rogerian analysis of social structures, and bless one’s conclusions with the odd text. Such analysis has managed to project the view that homes and churches are repressive institutions, while schools are liberating. Is that what Scripture says? Or in another field, I recall a social scientist (who is a committed, confessional believer) telling a group of us that he did not think that revival could turn this country around: the shifts in epistemology and social structure are so deep that a revival would not do it. What is this but a tacit tying of God’s hands, not unlike the attitude of the Israelites as they approached the Promised Land at Kadesh Barnea and listened to the reports of the ten spies? For Christians, optimism must forever remain naive, for we believe in sin, even in original sin; but for us, pessimism is atheistic. It is far too sure of what God cannot do; it is far too quick to analyze on purely naturalistic premises.

More broadly, the Bible’s many books and numerous literary genres are all set within a detailed storyline that must be deeply absorbed. Profound grasp of and adherence to that storyline will not only keep us from some important mistakes in our various disciplines, but will place us within a Christian worldview that marks us as different. Christians cannot long withstand the enormous and subtle pressures to “conform to this world” (Ro 12:1-2) unless they see the temptation in terms of a clash of worldviews. They cannot possibly understand the nature of that clash unless they have a firm, intelligent grasp of what the Bible’s worldview looks like and are loyal to it. The Christian university, then, will make much of this worldview, seek to plumb its shape and significance, and pass it on to new generations of students.

(4) Because Christians recognize their finiteness and their sinful minds, the Christian university is called, whatever its prophetic voice, to humility of mind and the kind of communal care that fosters integrity and candor.

Christians insist that objective truth is knowable in measure, but this is no reason for intellectual condescension or dismissive anger. How then shall we insist on the former without succumbing to the latter?

The students of Carl F. H. Henry have known him to say that there are two kinds of presuppositionalists: those who admit it, and those who do not. Late modernism frequently tried to exclude Christianity from the university on the ground that it was not knowledge. Knowledge was tied, implicitly or explicitly, to a naturalistic presupposition. By exposing the impossibility of autonomous reason, postmodernism is, rather ironically, opening a place for Christians at the intellectual table. But postmodernism wants Christians to participate out of the conviction that their beliefs, their hold on “truth,” is not superior to any other such claims—and this Christians cannot do without denying the Lord.
who bought them. But if all truth is presuppositional (a point postmoderns do not doubt), the question becomes how one warrants any truth claim.

A scholar such as Pelikan cannot accept the kind of a priori relativism that characterizes so much of postmodernism. He argues that relativism can be either a priori or ex post facto—either an assumption one brings to the table (making relativism inescapable and the “paralysis of analysis” inevitable), or an “after the fact” relativism that is nothing more than “the admission that after thinkers or scholars or judges have done their best to be honest and not to intrude themselves and their prejudices on their material, the results of their research and thought will still be flawed and will bear the marks of the time and place and personality in which they have arisen.” Read sympathetically, that is doubtless true, but it does not explain how finite and sinful people can ever arrive at the truth; read more skeptically, it fails to respond to the most burning epistemological issues faced today.

But Christians insist that truth is knowable. We are grateful to postmoderns for reminding us of what many Christians forgot: our knowing is never with the certainty that belongs only to Omniscience. Our knowing is never atemporal or acultural but is inevitably temporally and culturally located; our knowing is often distorted by moral and intellectual failures (we insist on the noetic effects of sin). Nevertheless, we may know some objectively true things truly, even if never exhaustively. The models by which to think about such knowing I have sketched elsewhere. For the moment it is sufficient to insist that a Christian university lives under the entailments of its confessional allegiance. One of those entailments is that truth is knowable, for by God’s grace we have come to perceive some of what God himself has disclosed.

At the same time, the revelation by which we as Christians are constrained teaches us that God did not choose his people because of their strength or size or military prowess, but simply because he loved them, and their forefathers before them. We are never more than poor beggars telling other poor beggars where there is bread. We follow a Master who took up his cross and died the most odious and ignominious death. If we take up our more metaphorical cross, we will present ourselves as humble witnesses, not as arrogant know-it-alls. Within the community, we learn to express the outworking of the gospel that lies at the heart of the Bible’s storyline.

(5) Because of its God-centeredness, the Christian university will recognize that it is beholden to the church, to the world, and to the God who inhabits eternity.

That means, among other things, that Christians working in a Christian university will put a muzzle on their pride, one of the terrible sins of universities. In the secular arena, university professors may think of themselves as the elite of society; in the Christian arena, university professors may think of themselves as the elite of the elect. But Christians who attempt to order their lives in the light of Scripture will recognize that the societal institution to which they owe primary allegiance is neither the state nor the university, but the church. Moreover, just as the apostle Paul thinks of himself as a debtor to all (Ro 1:14), so Christians will reflect the same sense of indebtedness. That not only reduces pride, but drives mission: we recognize the imago Dei in all fellow human beings, and ask not how we
may dominate, but how we may serve. Above all, because we have wrestled with the truth that there is nothing we are or have accomplished but what, directly or indirectly, we have received from God himself (1 Co 4:7; Jas 1:17), we are to learn not only the grace of gratitude but how to look at reality from God’s perspective.

According to Jesus, from God’s perspective it is more important to lay up treasures in heaven than on earth; it is more important to hear the Father’s “Well done!” on the last day than to receive all the praise (and the complimentary book reviews) in the world; it is more important to be ready for death than it is to be ready for a university promotion; it is more important to win people to Christ than to win a reputation. A Christian university that boasts about how many leaders it has turned out must ask itself what kind of leaders they are. If we produce leaders who are indistinguishable from the leaders produced by other universities, we are a Christian university in name only and have horribly compromised our heritage, for Jesus himself erects quite a different vision of leadership. A Christian university that is sleazy in its financial operations, sycophantic in its relationships, willfully blind in its lack of principled discipline, self-indulgent in its leadership, skirting the truth with its supporters, or externally pious while morally frail in its leadership (recall Jesus’ frequent excoriation of hypocrites), has sacrificed the right to prefix “university” with “Christian.”

In short, administrators, scholars, and students alike in a Christian university must constantly be working out, in the light of Scripture, just what it means to be a Christian. That is always reflected in relationships, and it in turn shapes what it means to be a Christian university. True, a Christian university is not a church. Some mission statements of Christian universities sound far too similar to the mission statements of churches to be realistic. To be a Christian university is first of all to be a university. But granted that reality, to be a Christian university transforms our relationships, both individual and corporate, with the church, with the world, and above all with God himself.

(6) Because of its God-centeredness, the Christian university seeks to maintain a tension between a world-wide openness on the one hand, and cultural integrity and sensitivity at the local level on the other.

Because we believe that there is but one sovereign God who rules over all peoples and cultures, and because we believe in common grace, we accept with gratitude the increased awareness of other cultures around the world. But because a particular university is inevitably tied to a particular culture, and perhaps to a particular denomination and heritage, faithfulness and integrity demand an ordered accountability in that arena. If in previous generations there was a constant, regrettable tendency to assume that our culture must be the best, in the present post-modern mood there is an equally regrettable tendency to assume that all cultures are of equal quality and worth. This latter tendency sometimes works itself out in an eclectic approach that is intellectually sloppy and unwittingly more arrogant and condescending than anything it replaces.

Consider, for example, the recently published book, The Dictionary of Global Culture, edited by Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. At one level, this marvelous compendium of 1,200 short essays is a masterpiece of information. But one rarely glimpses how elements within a culture work together. This is not a dictionary of global cultures;
it is a dictionary of global culture. A generation ago we used to tweak "mid-Atlantic" persons—people who were too British to be American and too American to be British. It was a wry way of saying that they did not really belong anywhere. Nowadays "mid-Atlantic" is too north-Atlantic a designation. Nowadays we are to become "mid-earth" persons—and this is seen not as an unfortunate compromise that leaves us rootless but as a glorious expression of global culture.

Whereas global cultures are fascinating, global culture is plastic. It is an eclectic form without roots or depth. This is not to argue surreptitiously for a return to colonial views of culture. Nor is it to deny that in many contexts an eclectic ingathering of cultural tidbits from around the globe might prove both informing and helpful. It is to say that realistic listening to Scripture encourages us to engage cultures at a deeper level. Paul is willing to become all things to all men so that by all means he may win some (1 Co 9:19-23). Contemporary globetrotters are in danger of such eclecticism that they become nothing to anyone, never winning anyone.

That means an American Midwestern Christian university needs to understand where it is planted and operate comfortably from that base. For all that it may invest in trying to accommodate its international students by explaining American culture to them, providing venues where internationals may feel secure among their own, exposing Americans to the great heritage of cultures over which God reigns, and preparing people to live and serve in diverse cultures, that Midwestern university will best be able to fulfill these universal responsibilities when it is aware of its own culture. Thoughtful Christians have given up trying to be trans-cultural. It is impossible anyway, and merely produces plastic. God himself disclosed himself to us in particular times and places, in a specific culture with specific languages. That is part of the "scandal of historical particularity" that lies at the heart of the Christian revelation. That does not mean all are to become first-century Jews like Jesus. We insist that cultures can communicate with one another. One of the glories of the gospel is how it has embedded itself and taken root in so wide an array of cultures around the world. But it is a denial of this cultural wealth, and finally a denial of the incarnation itself, to love people everywhere and no one in particular, to be sensitive to cultures everywhere while never being rooted in any of them—in short, to be "mid-earth” people. It was not Jesus’ way; it was not Paul’s way.

(7) Within the vision of the Christian university already laid out, it is entirely appropriate to provide both liberal arts education and professional training. But in both cases the Christian university will transform the discussion and the tension between the two visions.

Because of the extraordinary explosion of knowledge during the past two or three centuries, the years devoted to mastery of one tiny subset of a subject may be many. Certainly there are still many people who dabble in several fields, and some may become competent in more than one. But the ideal of the Renaissance person is now forever beyond us; there are not enough hours in a single lifetime. One of the effects of this development is that the debate between liberal arts training (recall Newman’s second point) and professional training has intensified. If there is inadequate time to do both, which should prevail?
From a Christian perspective, the antithesis is unwisely cast. A Christian university will want to train scientists, lawyers, engineers, historians, politicians, and more. But above all it will want to foster a profoundly Christian worldview in them, along with a deep devotion to Christ that is not only visceral and affective but thoughtful and comprehensive. This will make better scientists, lawyers, engineers, historians, and politicians—provided, of course, that the quality of their professional training is competitive.

On the other hand, a Christian university will recognize that both the church and society are enriched by individuals who have read widely and learned to weigh and evaluate and think critically, beyond merely professional competence. It will therefore eschew an approach to tertiary education that is reductionistically oriented toward professional training. But this liberal arts education must itself be informed and shaped by the determination to inculcate a biblical worldview. If students are exposed to the “great books” but have not thought deeply, comprehensively, and in an integrated way about the greatest Book, where is the advantage? Why, indeed, should a university that fails in this respect call itself a Christian university? True, all truth is God’s truth. But that does not mean that there is no center, no framework, no worldview to be adopted. One tires of observing the number of colleges and universities who at some time in their (modernist) past adopted as their slogan, “You shall know the truth, and the truth will set you free” (Jn 8:32). Nowadays, of course, that sounds quaint to postmodernists; to most others there is little appreciation of the context, the framework, the worldview in which those lines were first penned. The residual piety masks a massive blasphemy. So although a Christian university will foster the best of liberal arts education, it will resolutely set its face against attempts to elevate this heritage above the framework of informed Christian worldview formation.

(8) A Christian university will rigorously reflect on academic freedom and confessional fidelity.

We must face the question squarely: In terms of coercion and ideological commitment, precisely how does a Christian university differ from, say, a Marxist university in China? Is that not the implicit question lurking behind the assertions of those who say that a Christian university is an oxymoron? Are not Christians so ideologically committed that they are not free to pursue the truth, the way people are free in an “ordinary” university?

There are many responses. First, as we have seen, the so-called “ordinary” universities are far from being ideologically neutral. Neutrality is impossible for finite sentient creatures. Second, the question sometimes masks divergent agendas. If the suggestion that a “Christian university” is an oxymoron were made by a Marxist academic, it might simply reflect the fact that he or she thinks that “scientific” evidence supports Marxist theory, and therefore a Christian interpretation of reality must be unscientific. If the charge were made by a philosophical naturalist, it may simply be an automatic ruling out of anything supernatural—which is of course a powerful ideology itself. If the charge is purely pragmatic, under the assumption that an “ordinary” university allows Christian views, atheist views, Buddhist views, new age views, or whatever, in a healthy interaction, while the Christian university is so narrow that it is
incapable of self-correction, then one must reply: (i) in that case it is less than clear what is the unifying factor in the university; (ii) more importantly, many Western universities are happy to have Christians among their faculty, but there are very few that are open to having a Christian worldview promulgated there. In other words, “ordinary” universities are often the most doctrinaire of all. Third, the problem with, say, a Marxist university system in a totalitarian country such as China is that there is no competing system. If citizens do not toe the party line, they cannot gain a tertiary education. But if someone cannot gain an education at a Christian university, there are plenty of other flavors around. Thus in Western culture the Christian university threatens no one more than the philosophical materialist, who is so convinced his view of reality is correct that he wants to stop the proliferation of reasoned alternatives.

But there are more complex questions to think about under this heading. What is the substance of freedom? Is it found in the right to say anything I please? Most would admit it is not. Those enmeshed in the outlook of late modernity want it to be the right to publish and explore and teach the truth, in an atmosphere that (i) fears no administrative or governmental retaliation and (ii) presupposes naturalism. Christian supernaturalism is therefore ruled out of bounds by the latter criterion. A postmodernist understands academic freedom as the right to publish and explore and teach what one finds compatible with one’s interpretive community, within a framework that celebrates the articulation of all views save any that says it is at base objectively true and that those contradicting it are correspondingly false. Christian confessionalism is therefore again ruled out of bounds.

Christians will delight in John 8:32, just cited, and understand from the context that the ultimate freedom is freedom from sin—from all the self-orientation and rebellion that blinds us to our Maker and Redeemer and all the truth he has disclosed about himself, ourselves, the universe, and all that is and will be. To be unfree in this arena is to be out of step with reality, and to live under the tyranny of self-absorption and under the threat of God’s judgment. At their best, Christians will not want to coerce agreement on these matters; by all means let others articulate their views. Let there be naturalist or postmodern universities. What makes competition difficult is the massive government subsidizing of ideologies that proclaim themselves to be neutral when they are not. By and large we do not object to these realities. Rather, we object to the self-serving pretensions of academic freedom that are ideologically driven, for from our perspective they serve only to hide the truth.

Christian universities must also reflect on the degree of academic freedom that is encouraged within the border of Christian confessionalism. Not all Christian confessionalism agrees on all points. Even the brands of Christianity widely dubbed “orthodox” boast many variations. What is meant by academic freedom in, say, a confessionally dispensational Christian university? in a confessionally Reformed, paedo-baptist Christian university? It would take quite a different essay to outline what kind of confession I might encourage a fledgling Christian university to adopt. But once a confession has been adopted, no matter how tight or loose the boundary, there will always be some tension between responsible accountability
and freedom to explore the fringes. As a rule of thumb, one may allow some scholars to ship water, so long as they learn to bail. It is when they rejoice in the leaks that firmer action is required. A similar tension exists in the moral and ethical areas. Because Christianity is not merely an intellectual worldview (though it is not less than that), but a way of life, most Christians institutions of higher learning adopt some sort of standard of conduct that is, in most arenas, more tightly defined than what is adopted in its secular counterparts. Inevitably, wherever the lines are drawn there will always be tough cases. But this cannot be an appeal for the abolition of limits, whether confessional or ethical.

How best to preserve the confessional and ethical heritage I shall briefly discuss below. My sole point at this juncture is that Christian universities must constantly reflect rigorously on academic freedom and confessional fidelity.

Some Priorities

If we answer the question in the title with a strong affirmative, and adopt some such vision of the Christian university as what has just been outlined, what ought to be our priorities? The following list is nothing more than a brief priming of the pump. Each of the four suggestions could be treated at length, and the list itself could be greatly extended. The question that elicits these paragraphs is this: What priorities should a Christian university adopt?

1. **Teach the Bible.** This is no peripheral matter. Many are the Christian universities that have so cut back on Bible or theology courses in order to make room for the “essential” courses in the discipline that in due course the institution has stopped being Christian in all but name and in the Divinity department—and eventually in those two areas as well. I am not suggesting the kinds of *pro forma*, “mickey mouse” courses that engineering or psychology students endure in order to get to the good stuff they came for. Careful curricular planning must go into shaping the right kinds (and percentages) of Bible/theology courses in each program of a Christian university. Enormous institutional energy needs to go into finding and funding the *best* teachers for these sorts of courses. If this requirement adds to the length of the program, so be it: the Christian university loses its *raison d’etre* if it abandons this component of its vision.

It is not enough to have Christian teachers (though that is essential); it is necessary for both faculty and students to learn how to think Christianly, and that simply cannot be done where knowledge of Scripture and theology is slashed to some minimalist residue.

Moreover, the teaching of Scripture should not be restricted to the classroom and to certain parts of the curriculum. Substantial institutional energy needs to go into developing a worshipping community, which takes more than rules about chapel attendance. What is required is a culture of gratitude and worship, and utter excellence in this component of university life. Most Christian universities fail in this area, because people are so busy (understaffing is endemic) that little time is reserved for creative excellence in this arena. The Christian university is an institution where faculty and students alike are encouraged, without mere legalism, to spend much time reading their Bibles (yes, that’s what I said—an almost lost commitment these days) and talking about what it says.

2. **Teach the Bible worldviewishly.** This
point deserves a separate heading. It is not enough simply to fill students’ minds with details drawn from the Bible’s pages (though it is impossible to learn a sophisticated worldview without also learning a fair bit of content).

The urgency of this priority is accelerating, owing to the growing number of Christian students whose biblical knowledge is slim, and whose grasp of the “big picture” is nonexistent. I suspect we fail to appreciate how much of the “big picture” was absorbed a couple of generations ago from the assumptions of Judeo-Christian outlook that permeated much of our culture, especially at the popular level. Nowadays we hear intelligent seminary graduates saying that they still do not have their Bibles “together.”

To articulate a Christian worldview, it is necessary to do several things. (i) It is necessary to get across the Bible’s storyline, and how the parts fit into the whole. In other words, it is essential that we teach a great deal more biblical theology than most of us do at present. (ii) It is necessary to cast the storyline not only in terms of its biblical rootedness, but in terms of its detailed mandates and implications for how we live. (iii) It is necessary to cast this Christian worldview over against competing worldviews. This is important not only to prepare students for some apologetic task, but to clarify their own heritage. One’s worldview is clarified and perhaps even first crystallized when it is cast over against competing alternatives in the culture. One of the strengths of Phillip Johnson’s recent work is its willingness to tackle not simply the minutiae of Darwinism or naturalism, but the massive worldview questions. He insists, for instance, that we keep forcing the question, “What should we do if empirical evidence and materialist philosophy are going in different directions?” That question is never allowed among those committed to philosophical naturalism, even though there is plenty of evidence to make it an obvious question. That question can readily be asked by Christians and we must ask it. But in the final analysis it is not enough to learn to question the worldview of others; it is essential that we learn to develop our own. Christians who have studied at Christian universities and never learned to think worldviewishly have been robbed of a quality education.

Enormous intellectual energy must be devoted to this challenge. It will involve us in preparing university teachers to think and teach in this way, because quite frankly not many do. In the long haul, it will prepare faculty and students to see the hermeneutical advantages to thinking out of this sort of framework. Christian students are often intimidated into thinking that most Christian scholarly endeavor is reactionary. Other groups have the brilliant ideas (good, bad, or indifferent), and we merely respond to them. But not a little creative work done on, say, the Bible, is creative precisely because it operates out of a framework that we judge to be unfaithful. Not a little of Bultmann’s creative brilliance depended on his naturalism-cum-pantheism: he certainly could not approach the Bible in any traditional sense, and the interaction of his committed worldview with the text issued in creative syntheses. But “creative” does not necessarily mean right, or even enduring. Bultmann is now largely passé. More importantly, Christians working within the framework of orthodox confessionalism also bring to the intellectual tasks of our day entire structures of thought that will prompt us to ask questions that Bultmann would...
never have thought of. In other words, there are considerable hermeneutical advantages to thinking worldviewishly.

In short, we must see that teaching the Bible worldviewishly is not an optional extra for elite institutions, but an urgent requirement of all Christian tertiary education, especially the Christian university. The gains in stabilizing Christians, developing intelligent worldview evangelism, and growing in hermeneutical enrichment will be incalculable.

(3) Pursue excellence. Admittedly, the exact shape of excellence will vary a bit from institution to institution, from student body to student body, and so forth. Excellence may not be measured in exactly the same way in a Christian university committed to helping as many kids from the slums gain a leg up the educational ladder as it will in a Christian university whose primary clientele comes from stable and well-to-do homes. Nevertheless, excellence is something more often acknowledged in the breach than in practice.

For a start, one might insist that more administrators and lecturers read the cheeky book by James V. Schall, Another Sort of Learning: Selected Contrary Essays on How Finally to Acquire an Education While Still in College or Anywhere Else: Containing Some Belated Advice about How to Employ Your Leisure Time When Ultimate Questions Remain Perplexing in Spite of Your Highest Earned Academic Degree, Together with Sundry Book Lists Nowhere Else in Captivity to Be Found.25 In the humanities, we must do far more to encourage students to read primary sources, and learn to read and write thoughtfully and critically. Moreover, “excellence” will not be restricted to the mere mastering of a body of material (as wonderfully important as that is), but will embrace thoughtful interaction with others.

The driving force behind this pursuit of excellence is worship. We are to love the Lord our God with our minds, Jesus insists. Excellence pursued for its own end can degenerate into idolatry; it is certainly idolatrous if we pursue excellence in order to be thought excellent. But pursuit of excellence as a sacred trust and glorious privilege is a wonderful freedom.

(4) Reflect hard and often on how to preserve the institution. The list of Christian universities that have over time become something quite different is depressing. People have sometimes asked me why there is, apparently, a universal tendency for Christian universities to drift toward the academic “left.” I deny the tendency. Rather, there is a universal tendency for Christian universities to drift toward the dominant voices in the culture, especially the dominant intellectual voices in the culture. Thus, under Hitler German universities drifted “right” along many axes. Most South African universities upheld Apartheid during the years before Nelson Mandela became President.

The temptation to drift, then, is not toward a predictable and specifiable goal, but away from the Christian heritage and toward the dominant intellectual spirit of the age. What can be done about it? The following suggestions are entirely preliminary.

(i) Develop a tradition of a theologically and practically informed Board. Considerable amounts of time should be devoted to such training. Boards can be wonderfully stabilizing when they are theologically informed and blessed with administrations under them that are candid, evenhanded, and not manipulative. Constantly re-think structures to foster these goals.

(ii) Chief academic officers responsible for hiring faculty must themselves be
vetted in the most penetrating ways, not only for their own orthodoxy, but for their tolerances. It is one thing to affirm your personal belief in some confession or other; it is another to have thought through questions of confessional tolerance so thoroughly and sympathetically that nepotism, denominational allegiance, friendship, and institutional loyalty all pale in comparison to the primary responsibility you have to pass on the institution in at least as good a shape, theologically speaking, as the condition it was in when you found it.

(iii) Encourage candor and integrity. When a faculty member is working through some difficult issue, be as supportive and helpful as possible. But when that faculty member has come down, however hesitantly, on a side that is in direct opposition to the doctrinal heritage, integrity (in the faculty member) demands that he or she resign, and integrity (in the administration) demands that the faculty member be dismissed.

(iv) Several studies have shown that faculty members have often been far less in agreement with the statement of faith they signed than one might have thought from the signature itself. It is essential that interviewing procedures be not only fair, but probing. This means that at least some of those in charge must not only be theologically informed and orthodox themselves, but they must also be au courant with contemporary debates. For instance, a dean who has not read a thing in the area of epistemology and the rise of Postmodernism will almost certainly get snookered by prospective faculty members badly in need of a job and meaning very different things than the dean when the same expressions are used.

(v) Ensure that at least some of the top administrators are theologically informed, orthodox, and current. Studies have shown that one of the first steps toward drift in Christian universities has been the appointment of top administrators who are personally orthodox but who are entirely dependent on the advice of others for any theological discussion that is at all sophisticated.

(vi) Christian universities with church-based connections have a variety of structural connections they may adopt that would enhance fidelity.

(vii) Pursue faculty members who have not only avowed agreement with the university’s position, but who delight in Scripture, and who are excited about the possibility of studying and teaching in an environment that takes Scripture seriously and tries to think worldviewishly.

(viii) In the course of time, bring together within the university scholars from diverse backgrounds to work out together not only what Scripture says on certain matters, but how what it says must impact this or that discipline. For example, it might be possible to develop a working group on creation. Include on Old Testament scholar, one expert in the history of doctrine, one physicist, one biologist, one philosopher, one geologist, and one expert in literature or hermeneutics. The group might meet for two or three hours once a month, each time having read in advance a book suggested by a different member. Some such groups might eventually produce something worthy of publication, but that would not be the primary aim. The aim would be to bring together the intellectual resources of the university, under the Scriptures, to enrich the community and become more mature in Christian articulation in a variety of arenas. The aim is the development of a Christian mind, a Christian community with intellectual integrity, while simultaneously
reducing the danger of lone ranger scholars promoting half-baked and adventure-some theories that are far more indebted to the spirit of the age than they perceive.

One could imagine scores of such groups working on various issues dealing with economics, on literary questions, on cultural matters, on historical questions, on moral and ethical questions, on governmental and political issues, questions of art and music, and so forth. At the outset such groups should be entirely voluntary, but one can easily think of ways in which the university could foster and encourage such groups (e.g. provide a meal or other incentive). In due course it might be possible to mandate participation in some such group for all incoming faculty. But such a course will prove counter-productive if the university is already bleeding its faculty dry. Faculty who are over-extended by ridiculous student/teacher ratios and an inefficient and bloated bureaucracy will not respond happily to institutional demands for yet another chunk of time. Thus inevitably the viability and value of this sort of program is linked to income, load, incentives, and above all to the quality of the leadership in the institution.

(ix) One can easily conjure up other institutional steps. Every university, even small ones, have a few faculty who are especially gifted at thinking through questions of worldview, doctrine, and cross-disciplinary matters, within a God-centered and confessional framework. Such people might well be used to give series of talks to the rest of the community, with ample encouragement for discussion and feedback. Mentoring systems for new faculty might be helpful in some cases. But all of these proposals presuppose adequate resources allied to vision ary leadership. If either the resources or the leadership is lacking, suggestions such as these will inevitably burn themselves out in cynicism.

Conclusion

Can there be a Christian university? Of course. But there is a great deal of work to be done, many things to be learned, and many commitments to undertake if we are to establish excellent ones that grow and endure for long periods of time, bringing glory to God, strength to the church, and grace to the broader culture.

ENDNOTES

1 This is one chapter from a collection of essays being published in June 1998, as part of the centenary celebrations of Trinity International University. The volume is being edited by David Martin and published by the University Press. It is reproduced here with permission.

2 There is now a considerable literature on this subject. See especially Debora Kuller Shuger, The Renaissance Bible: Scholarship, Sacrifice, and Subjectivity (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1994).

3 See especially the important analysis and critique of this point by Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1991).


5 It has appeared in many editions. One of the more recent and useful editions is edited by Frank M. Turner, complete with interpretive essays by Martha McMackin Garland, Sara Castro-Klaren, George P. Landow, and George M. Marsden (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press,

Perhaps the ablest volume of recent essays on this subject is the one edited by Gregory J. Walters, *The Tasks of Truth: Essays on Karl Jaspers’s Idea of the University* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996).


Ibid., 3. Also cited in the introduction of Walters, ed., *The Tasks of Truth*, 16.


Ibid., 78.

I hasten to add that this shift is “widespread” and not universal. Once the preserve of a handful of intellectuals, however, it is now the common coinage of intellectual discussion. For a powerful analysis of the situation entirely from within a rear-guard of modernist scientists, see the important book by Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt, *Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1994). Inevitably there are some intellectuals who have come through postmodernism and emerged on the other side to some sort of pragmatic, modified foundationalism. But as far as I can see, that is not where the intellectual tide is currently taking us. Individual retreats from the brink of postmodern relativism are driven by fear and by a deep-seated suspicion that this cannot be right, not by a mature alternative that is taking hold in the intellectual world or in the media.

The most recent example is a pair of articles by Martin E. Marty and Jacob Neusner in *Religious Studies News* 12/3 (Sept. 1997) 20, 48; 21, 48, respectively.

I have culled this example from Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Idea of the University: A Reexamination* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1992)

Ibid., 18.


Ibid., 29.


By this phrase, I am allowing that a secular university heavily indebted to political correctness may define certain forms of conduct more tightly than its Christian counterpart.

*Defeating Darwinism by Opening Minds* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1997).

Ibid., 114.